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MARITIME INSURANCE FOR OFFSHORE
RISKS: CURRENT POLICY FORMS, INDUSTRY
PROBLEMS, AND RECENT DECISIONS
Richard Rutherford*
The importance of insurance to owners or operators engaged in
offshore drilling operations and the accompanying exposure to
liability for personal injuries and death is best illustrated by the
fact that the insurer or underwriter pays for the damages resulting
from most maritime casualties.
Insuring offshore risks has been an evolutionary process, start-
ing the the 1950's with an amalgamation of marine and non-marine
concepts and progressing until today, where there are sophisticated
new coverages tailored to meet the demands and requirements of
vessel owners, oil operators, service companies, and other maritime
venturers.
This paper focuses briefly on the coverage of some aspects of
maritime liabilities, particularly in the area of personal injury and
death.
If the assured is a vessel owner, he may buy what is commonly
known as P&I insurance, the term P&I standing for "Protection and
Indemnity," which generally covers legal liability for: (1) loss of life
of or personal injury to or illness of any person except employees of
the assured covered under any compensation act; (2) hospital,
medical, or other expenses necessary and reasonable incurred in
respect to loss of life of or personal injury to or illness of a member
of the crew or any other person; (3) repatriation expense, travel,
maintenance, and cure of a member of a crew; (4) loss or damage to
any vessel or craft or property thereon, not caused by collision,
provided such liability does not arise by reason of a contract made
by the assured; (5) damage to any dock, pier, harbor, bridge, buoy,
lighthouse, or other structure or property insofar as same is not
covered by full Hull insurance; (6) cost or expense of, or incidental
to, the removal of the wreck of the vessel named therein when
compulsory under law; and (7) loss of or damage to any other vessel
or craft, or property thereon, caused by collision with the insured
*M.B.E., A.C.I.I.; General Manager of Lloyd's Underwriter's Claims and Rec-
coveries Office; Member, Technical & Clauses Committee (Institute of London Under-
writers); Membre Titulcuie, Comite Maritime Internationale. The author is indebted to
Mr. Warren M. Faris of the New Orleans Bar for his assistance.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
vessel, insofar as such liability would not be covered by full insur-
ance under the standard form of Hull policy.
Although these coverages will vary as between the ocean form
and so-called river or inland forms, the coverages provided by tradi-
tional primary P&I insurance are predicated on liabilities imposed
by reason of some act or omission of the vessel which, under usual
concepts of imputed responsibility, would impose liability on the
vessel owner.
The term "owner" as used in this statement includes what is
commonly referred to as owner pro hac vice, meaning an owner "for
this occasion." Such an owner also is commonly referred to as a
"bareboat charterer." Under a bareboat charter, the charterer, in
contrast to a time or voyage charterer, furnishes all crew, fuel,
equipment, and supplies, takes complete control of the vessel, and
directs her navigation and operation. Major oil operators and others
engaged in a drilling venture offshore usually are named as addi-
tional assureds in P&I policies. Unless the client occupies a position
of owner or bareboat charterer in connection with all vessels used
by him in the performance of his offshore operations, he should not
depend solely upon the protection afforded by the vessels' P&I
policies.
This limitation of coverage generally has been sustained in the
decisions which have interpreted this issue and is best exemplified
by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Lanasse v. Travelers Insurance Company.'
A crew member aboard a utility tender owned by Cheramie, and
under a time charter to Chevron, suffered serious bodily injuries
during a loading operation. Chevron ordered the vessel to go to a
Chevron fixed offshore production platform to move a welding
machine from the west to the east side of the platform. Chevron's
crane operator lowered the welding machine onto the afterdeck of
the vessel, which was then shifted to the other side of the platform.
After the plaintiff had attached the hook to the cargo, but before he
had moved clear of the machine, Chevron's crane operator began
lifting but stopped when the machine was raised five or six inches
above the deck. This caused the load to swing against the starboard
railing of the vessel and back into the plaintiff. The crane operator
then lowered the machine back onto the deck. The plaintiff, while
attempting to get out of the way, was knocked back and crushed.
The district court found that the negligence of Chevron's crane
operator was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Further, the
1. 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972).
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vessel was found not to be unseaworthy, and no member of the
vessel's crew was held to be guilty of negligence. Consequently,
Chevron was held liable for the full amount of the funds provided to
the plaintiff in settlement of his claim.
Chevron appealed this decision on the ground, among others,
that its liability was covered under the terms of the P&I policy pro-
cured by Cheramie pursuant to the terms of the charter party.
Under the terms of the policy, Chevron was named as an additional
assured, and the underwriters' rights of subrogation against
Chevron were waived expressly.
The fifth circuit held that the P&I policy did not provide
coverage of the plaintiff's claim because, although Chevron was a
named assured, it did not become liable "as owner of" the vessel.!
The vessel "offered nothing further than a condition or locale for the
accident."' The fifth circuit concluded:
[W]here injury is done through nonvessel operations, the vessel
must be more than the inert locale of the injury. Nothing more
occurred here, for it was Chevron's actions as a platform
operator or as a crane operator that caused the harm, and that
does not make it a liability of a shipowner.'
Shortly after Lanasse was reported, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana confronted an analogous
but different controversy in Dow Chemical v. Tug THOMAS
ALLEN. Dow owned a workover barge which was being towed by
the Tug THOMAS ALLEN from one drilling rig to another. The
Dow service engineer in charge of the barge insisted that the tug
navigate its tow through a relatively shallow bay in which there
were many unmarked gas pipelines, despite the fact that the tug
was not equipped with appropriate pipeline charts. Although the
tug's master initially protested, he capitulated. The tug collided
with a gas pipeline and the barge was damaged in the resulting
explosion and fire, which also injured a barge crew member.
The court found the Dow service engineer negligent in insisting
that his barge be towed through the shallow bay without adequate
charts or other guides to the pipeline locations.8 Further, the tug
2. The policy provided that the insurance company "undertakes to pay up to the
amount hereby insured ...such sums as the assured, as owner of the Vessels as per
Schedule, shall have become legally liable to pay and shall have paid.
3. 450 F.2d at 584.
4. Id. (citation omitted).
5. 349 F. Supp. 1354 (E.D. La. 1972).
6. Id. at 1360.
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captain was held to be negligent in failing to refuse to undertake the
hazardous journey.'
The P&I policy provided coverage only for "those losses or
damage for which the insured became legally liable as owner of the
vessels named in the policy."' Although Dow was named as an addi-
tional assured, the workover barge was not named in the policy. The
Tug THOMAS ALLEN was named. Since Dow's liability arose solely
from its negligence as a barge owner and not "in respect of" the
insured tug, as required by the tug's P&I policy, the policy was held
not to provide coverage of Dow's liability.'
Although the result in the Dow case is essentially similar to
Lanasse, the different factual situation apparently caused the court
to recognize an additional requirement for the establishment of P&I
coverage by an additional assured. Unlike Lanasse, the assured
vessel was not merely a locale for the casualty, but was directly
involved in the accident and was partially responsible for the occur-
rence. However, since the additional assured's liability arose out of
negligence relating to another uninsured vessel, the tug's policy
provided no coverage. The only coverage afforded was to the named
assured for its negligence in the operation of the named vessel and
the consequent legal liability.
The principle enunciated in the Dow case was applied several
years later in Wedlock v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp.,"0 in which a
crew member from a tug was injured when, while attempting to free
a tow line, he fell into an open hatch on a McDermott barge in tow
of a tug." The court found that the casualty was proximately caused
by McDermott's negligence in delivering the barge with an open
hatch cover and by the tug's crew's negligence in shining a blinding
spotlight into the plaintiff's eyes. 2
The tug's P&I policy named McDermott as an additional assured
"as respects all vessels covered" under the policy, which specifically
named the tug as an insured vessel." However, since the barge was
not named, and McDermott's negligence arose only out of its capacity
as a barge owner and not as a charterer of the insured tug, the
policy did not cover McDermott's liability.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1362.
9. Id.
10. 554 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1977).
11. Id. at 241.
12. Id. at 243.
13. Id. at 242.
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Interestingly, McDermott argued that since there was a causal
nexus between the insured tug and the casualty, Lanasse authorized
a finding of coverage of McDermott's negligence, because it was an
additional assured with respect to the tug. However, the court
rejected this contention on the ground that there are two prere-
quisites to coverage: (1) There must be some causal operational rela-
tion between the vessel and the injury resulting from the additional
assured's negligence, and (2) This causal relation must be in respect
of an insured vessel.
14
In American Motorists Insurance v. American Employer's In-
surance Company,5 the Dow and Wedlock issues were not present,
and Lanasse was found to be clearly controlling.
In American Motorists, a crewboat was docked at a fuel facility.
A crew member left the vessel, went to an office, leaned out of a
window and fired three shots from his pistol. One bullet ricocheted
off a bottle and injured a third person."' The P&I policy on the
crewboat was held not to provide coverage of the assured's liability
for the crew member's actions, because there was no causal relation
between the insured vessel and the injury. 7
Approximately seven years after the Lanasse opinion, a decision
distinguishing Lanasse and finding coverage under a P&I policy was
rendered. In Offshore Logistics Services, Inc. v. Mutual Marine
Office, Inc.,8 the crewboat M/V STONES RIVER was transporting
members of a Southern Natural Gas drilling crew from a drilling rig
to port during rough weather and heavy seas. The weather and sea
conditions caused tremendous pitching and rolling of the vessel,
which resulted in the passengers' being tossed about."9 One member
of the drilling crew was thrown from his seat into the air and landed
across the seat frame, sustaining serious physical injuries."
Offshore Logistics was found to be primarily liable, because the
vessel had been piloted by an inexperienced and unlicensed crew
member, had been driven head on into the wave crests rather than
diagonally, and had been operated at grossly excessive speeds.2
Southern Natural Gas was held to be partially responsible, because
14. Id. at 244.
15. 447 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. La. 1978), remanded on other grounds, 600 F.2d 15
(5th Cir. 1979).
16. 447 F. Supp. at 1315.
17. Id. at 1319.
18. 462 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. La. 1978).
19. Id. at 488.
20. Id. at 489.
21. Id.
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the drilling foreman negligently had insisted that the voyage be
made in spite of the bad weather."
The crewboat, owned by Offshore Logistics, was covered by
primary and excess P&I policies, both of which named Southern
Natural Gas, the bareboat charterer, as an additional assured. The
policies indemnified against all loss or damage as the assureds "shall
as owners of the vessel named herein have become liable to pay
"23
After deciding without serious question that the liability of Off-
shore Logistics, the vessel owner, was clearly covered by the P&I
policies, Judge Sear extensively considered the issue of Southern
Natural Gas' claim as an additional assured for coverage of its lia-
bility under the same policies. Initially, the Lanasse requirement of
a causal nexus was examined and found to be satisfied.2 ' There was
only one vessel involved in the casualty, the M/V STONES RIVER,
which was named in the policy as an assured vessel. Southern
Natural Gas' negligence in sending the vessel out into hazardous sea
conditions was the ground on which its liability was assessed.
Therefore, this negligence was clearly vessel-related.
However, upon initial examination, the additional requirement
that Southern Natural Gas be acting as owner pro hac vice of the
vessel appeared not to be satisfied. Southern Natural Gas had
chartered the vessel and Offshore Logistics had supplied the crew.
Although these circumstances usually indicate the existence of a
time charter, the court found the agreements between the parties to
be contrary to this general indication. Offshore Logistics did not
time charter the vessel to Southern Natural Gas. The charter party
was in fact a "fairly typical" bareboat or demise charter. 5 In a
separate agreement, Southern Natural Gas hired Offshore Logistics
"as an independent contractor to man, operate . . . navigate and
supply" the vessel. 26 The court concluded that the charter party was
a true demise charter, the character of which was unaltered by the
operating agreement.27 Since Southern Natural Gas was a bareboat
charterer, it was considered to be the owner of the vessel pro hac
vice, which status was sufficient to comply with the policy's require-
ment that the additional assured's liability must arise "as owner of
the vessel."' 8
22. Id.
23. Id. at 489.
24. Id. at 490.
25. Id. at 491.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 492.
28. Id.
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Judge Sear was presented a second opportunity to deal with the
Lanasse and Dow P&I coverage issues in LaCross v. Craighead.'
The plaintiff was the captain of the M/V CATHY RUTH, a supply
boat time chartered to AWI, Inc. Captain LaCross was injured when
he fell on the vessel's deck on which defendants, AWI and Milchem,
had spilled drilling mud.' Both defendants were held to be responsi-
ble for the plaintiff's injuries."
The vessel owner, against whom no liability was assessed, had
obtained a P&I policy on the M/V CATHY RUTH.2 The policy
named AWI as an additional assured, but a printed endorsement
limited coverage to liabilities incurred by AWI only as owner or
charterer. However, this provision was altered by a typed endorse-
ment which gave the named assured the right to charter the
assured's vessels to AWl, which was named as an additional assured
during the term of the charter agreement." The typed endorsement
named AWI as an additional assured with no requirement that it be
acting as an owner or charterer at the time liability was incurred.U
Therefore, AWI was not required to establish its status as owner or
charterer as a prerequisite to general coverage under the policy;
AWI had avoided the second obstacle to coverage.
However, the causal operational relation standard of Lanasse
was applicable to AWI's claim for coverage. The policy provided to
AWI the same scope of coverage as that granted to the vessel
owner. The basic coverage provision of the policy insured the
vessel owner for "such sums as the assured, as owner of the M/V
CATHY RUTH, shall have become legally liable to pay ... ."" Con-
sequently, AWI was required to establish that its liability in the
present case arose out of its negligence as a vessel charterer rather
than as a platform operator.
The Lanasse standard was applied to this issue, and coverage
was denied to AWI because its liability arose out of the negligence
of its rig-based employees in unloading cargo from the vessel to the
rig. The vessel and crew were guilty of no negligence, and the
dangerous condition could have been created on the rig as easily as
on the vessel. The only factual distinction with Lanasse was that
29. 466 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. La. 1979).
30. Id. at 880-81.
31. Id. at 881.
32. Id. at 882.
33. Id. at 883.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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AWI's negligent employee was on the vessel's deck when he com-
mitted his negligent act. The court obviously considered this distinc-
tion to be without meaning. Since the vessel was merely the locale
of the accident, the Lanasse standard was not satisfied, and
coverage was denied. 7
The customary P&I policy also contains a provision that "in no
event shall the assurer be liable to any greater extent than if the
assureds were the owner and were entitled to all the rights of
limitation to which a shipowner is entitled." The importance of this
policy provision is realized when read in light of The Limitation of
Liability Act.3" The Act further provides that a charterer who shall
"man, victual and navigate the vessel at his own expense, or by his
own procurement" shall be deemed to be "owner" within the mean-
ing of the Act, i.e., entitled to limitation as an owner.3 9 This
customarily means that the so-called bareboat charterer may limit
his liability and that a time charterer may not. Assuming that a
vessel is a total loss after a casualty, and that the client is a time
charterer, the underwriters could decline liability for any sums over
and above the amount which underwriters would have been
required to pay had the assured been an owner entitled to limit
under the Act. In some instances, this provision may be deleted, for
an additional premium.
The P&I policy excludes any contractual liability coverage by
means of a clause providing that "liability hereunder shall in no
event exceed that which would be imposed on the assured by law in
the absence of contract." Since most vessel offshore contracts con-
tain "hold harmless" and "indemnity" agreements, coverage of
liability arising thereunder must be obtained elsewhere, generally in
comprehensive general liability policies.
The Comprehensive General Liability policy, a derivative of the
casualty insurance market as distinguished from the marine market,
covers third-party liability and can, for a premium, be endorsed to
cover marine operations by the deletion of the watercraft exclusion.
If this approach is used, the "care, custody and control" exclusion
37. Id. at 884-85.
38. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-95 (1976). The Limitation of Liability Act provides that a
vessel owner, absent personal negligence or privity of knowledge of unseaworthiness,
may limit his liability to the value of the vessel following a casualty. However, the
effect of the Limitation Act is questionable when Louisiana's Direct Action Statute,
La. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1958 & 1978), is applicable in view of the decisions which hold
that underwriters are not entitled to the benefits of the Act. See, e.g., Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 987 (1970).
39. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
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also should be deleted to cover certain other potential liabilities of
the offshore operator. By endorsement, and for an added premium,
this policy generally provides coverage for contractual liability
resulting from "hold harmless" and "indemnity" contractual provi-
sions.
Since the P&I policy does not respond for claims under any com-
pensation acts, state or federal, the offshore operator must cover
this exposure by what is known as an Employer's Liability policy.
This policy has two sections: (1) Section A, which covers compensa-
tion liability without limit; and (2) Section B, employers' liability not
otherwise covered by compensation. This policy must be endorsed
properly to cover the locations and operations of the assured and to
correctly refer to, if applicable, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,"0 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act," the state compensation acts applicable to the assured's opera-
tions, and the Death on the High Seas Act. 2 If the policy is intended
to cover liabilities under the Jones Act for transportation, wages, and
maintenance and cure, and for claims under the "borrowed servant"
doctrine, it must be endorsed accordingly. Additionally, an endorse-
ment is required to provide that a claim "in rem" shall be consid-
ered as a claim against the employer. The coverage must be inte-
grated properly with the assured's P&I policies.
A P&I policy covers vessel liability and the Employers' Liability
and Comprehensive General Liability policies cover operational
liability. If the client's maritime activities are not limited to par-
ticular vessels, then some consideration should be given to using the
integrated EL and CGL approach, appropriately endorsed to cover
such exposures, and to include liabilities in respect of removal of
wreck and debris, repatriation, and fines and penalties. Because of
complexities of a drilling operation, it is advisable to procure an
umbrella or bumpershoot policy to cover exposures in the
catastrophe area. If possible, these policies should be as broad as
the primary policies and, as added protection, should provide
coverage for exposures not covered by the primary policies, subject,
of course, to a deductible that the assured can financially retain.
Obviously, a program to protect assureds as fully as possible re-
quires great care to provide the needed coverage for offshore
maritime operations while avoiding overlap, gaps, and duplication
which can cause undue problems to the assured and, in some
instances, can negate coverage.
40. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1980).
41. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-56 (1980).
42. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976).
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